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The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho:
Reconsidering the Supreme Court's

Philosophy of Science
David Crump*

"Scientific methodology today is based on generatinghypotheses and testing
them to see if they can befalsified; indeed, this methodology is what
distinguishes sciencefrom otherfields of human inquiry."
Sir Karl Popper,Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth ofScientific
Knowledge,' as cited in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'

"[H]ypotheses non fingo (I don't generate hypotheses)."
3
Sir Isaac Newton, PrincipiaMathematica

The Supreme Court has left the law of expert witnesses in a confused state.
Its decision in Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.4 was intended to

liberalize the admittance of evidence,5 but instead it has produced a minefield
clogged with "Dauberthearings" that are more lengthy, technical, and diffuse
than anything that preceded them.6 Many judges have come to treat the factors

* Newell H. Blakely Professor of Law, University of Houston; A.B., 1966 Harvard
College; J.D., 1969, University of Texas.
1. (5th ed. 1989) at 37.
2. 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
3. Cited in Dan Hunter, No Wilderness ofSingle Instances: Inductive Inference in
Law, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 380 (1998).
4. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5. See infra Part I.A. The Author uses the term "admittance" rather than
"admission" to refer to the introduction of evidence to avoid confusion with the separate
concept of "admissions" in evidence law.
6. In my own experience as a trial lawyer, a pretrial hearing to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony was unusual before Daubert. It did not have a special
name and, when it did appear, generally was raised through a separate device such as a
motion in limine.
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set out in Daubertnot as flexible criteria, but as technical hurdles, tests to be
rigorously surmounted.' One respected trial judge, for example, has churned out
an exhaustive article that erects "eight gates" for expert witnesses.8 Later, in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,9 the Supreme Court recognized that the factors
it had set out in Daubert to govern scientific evidence might fit other kinds of
expert opinion poorly, but it nonetheless extended those very factors to the extent
that they conceivably might apply, leaving the law in an even more indeterminate
state. This trend has progressed so far, in fact, that a district court recently used
Daubert and its progeny as grounds for altogether excluding fingerprint
identification.' That court's reasoning seems to reflect an effort to apply the
Daubertfactors conscientiously, but the consequence seems simply to show that
the law of expert opinion has lost its compass. (The court later reversed itself.)"
This Article is about one of the guideposts in the journey toward this result:
the Supreme Court's definition of science. A major part of the problem, I
believe, is that the Daubert Court's conceptual approach to the philosophy of
science was unduly cramped. For example, if the Court's conception of science
in Daubertwere to be applied according to its terms, Sir Isaac Newton probably
would be disqualified from testifying to a question within his competence. 2 The
opinions of Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein likely would meet the same
fate. 3 Psychologist Howard Gardner, with his seven-typed theory of multiple
intellectual competence, may have influenced our educational system
profoundly, but if he were called to testify in a case within his claimed expertise,
he would be vulnerable to the charge that his methods lack the specific indicia
of scientific validity that the Supreme Court insisted upon inDaubert.4 Perhaps
these hypothetical experts are wrong about some of their conclusions, and there
certainly are those who have no use for some of their theories.' But surely
Newton, Freud, Einstein, and Gardner could "assist" a lay person in seeking the
truth about their sciences. A trial by censorship of these kinds of opinions can
be contemplated by imagining what the history of these great thinkers'
disciplines would be like without them.

7. See, e.g., infra notes 8, 10.
8. See generally Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gatesfor Expert Witnesses, 36 Hous.
L. REv. 743 (1999).
9. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
10. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(excluding prints), vacatedby 188 F. Supp. 2d. 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (reversing exclusion
of prints).
Ii. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
12. See infra Part II.B.2.
13. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
14. See infra Part II.B.4.
15. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing present-day attitudes toward the validity of
Freud's work).
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This Article begins with a brief exploration of the philosophy of science that
is laid out in the Daubert,Joiner, and Kumho cases. 6 It then proceeds to
examine the question, "what is science?" A related section considers the
disadvantages and ironic results of the Daubert-Kumho definition of science. 7
Next, the Article considers the characteristics of a good scientific theory or
model. It compares the resulting criteria to those set out in Daubert and its
progeny and shows how the Supreme Court's philosophy can produce dubious
8
consequences.'
A final section sets out my conclusions, which include the possibility that
the Supreme Court could have avoided some of the confusion created in Daubert
if it had confined itself to interpreting the rule that was at issue. 9 In short, the
Daubert Court should have refrained from prematurely establishing detailed
criteria until this area of law (and its own understanding of the problem) had
matured. The Court's reading of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as calling for
"appropriate validation" 2° of scientific evidence provided a less treacherous
guide to the lower courts, and that was where the Daubertopinion should have
ended. Today, the lower courts could improve the law of expert opinion (and
avoid silly results like excluding fingerprint identification) if they emphasized
"appropriate validation" as the overarching test."
I. THE DA UBERT, JOINER, AND KUMHO DECISIONS AND THE 2000
AMENDMENT TO RULE 702
Before Daubert, there was Frye v. United States,22 which adopted a
relatively rigorous and specific test that excluded all scientific evidence except
that which had achieved "general acceptance" in the field of which it is a part.23
Frye itself resulted in the exclusion of opinions derived from the use of a
precursor to the polygraph. Frye did not affect non-scientific expert witnesses,
however, and, therefore, financial witnesses, economists, and even physicians
regularly testified without having to pass its hurdle.24 Federal Rule of Evidence
702, without expressly rejecting the Frye test, adopted an alternate formulation:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," an expert "may testify

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part IV.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id. at 1014.
Id. The decision was limited to "scientific principle[s] or discover[ies]." Id.
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thereto."2 5 Thus, the Rule covered "scientific... knowledge," but the criterion
applied by the Rule was dependent upon whether the evidence would "assist" the
jury.
The courts of appeals interpreted Rule 702 in ways that produced "sharp
divisions."26 Some erected higher barriers to scientific opinion testimony, others
lower. It was against that background that the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. The case itself centered upon
a claim that a Merrell Dow anti-nausea drug called Bendectin had caused birth
defects.27 The plaintiffs' experts had "re-analyzed" previously published
epidemiological studies that had shown no causation of birth defects and had
done in vitro and in vivo animal studies. 2' Both the district court and the court
of appeals relied upon the Frye test to hold the plaintiffs' evidence
inadmissible. 29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether this
traditional approach to scientific expert testimony was still correct.
A. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Science as
"Falsifiability'"
The Supreme Court's first step in Daubertwas to reject the Frye test on the
ground that it was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.3" The general thrust of the Federal Rules, the Court explained, was
"a liberal one." The governing rule, Rule 702, did not embody the Frye test and
was inconsistent with it. "The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and
a rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal
thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers to "opinion" testimony."' 31 The Court characterized the Frye standard
as "austere," a test that was absent from and "incompatible with" the Federal
Rules, and held that it "should not be applied in federal trials. 32 Thus, the first
message of Daubert is that scientific expert opinion is covered not by Frye, but
by Rule 702, and it fits within a general policy of liberal admissibility.
Having established this policy of "relaxing" barriers to opinion testimony,
however, the Court naturally felt the need to emphasize that there were limits.
The first of these limits was that a scientific expert must be, in fact, testifying to

25. FED. R. EVID. 702.

26. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.
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"scientific... knowledge." 3 This phrase, said the Court, implied "a grounding
in the methods and procedures of science." This meant that an inference offered
in expert testimony "must be derived by the scientific method" and "must be
'
supported by appropriate validation."34
.Although the meaning of "appropriate validation" was not developed in the
record before the Court and had not been decided below, Justice Blackmun
proceeded to offer "some general observations."" The general observations
were in the nature of an advisory opinion,36 but the Court did not discuss that
issue. It declared that "a key question to be answered in determining whether a
theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact" would
be "whether it can be (and has been) tested."37 The Court then quoted
philosopher Karl Popper: "Scientific methodology... is based on generating
hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this
methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry."3
And the Court added other authorities: "[T]he statements constituting a
scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test";39 and "[t]he criterion
of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability."40 To this first, "key" criterion, the Court added three others: peer
review and publication, known or potential rate of error, and a concept of general
acceptance that mirrored the Frye test but was not to be used as the sole
criterion.4 The Court emphasized that the inquiry was to be "a flexible one,"42
and its advisory list of questions was not presumed to be "definitive."43
The Court mentioned at least two other requirements for scientific evidence.
The targeted scientific principle must not only be scientific, but it must "relate

33. Id. at 589-90.
34. Id. at 590.
35. Id. at 592-93.
36. An advisory opinion answers questions that are not dispositive of the case

presented. Strictly speaking, the general observations may not have been an advisory
opinion because they had at least the possibility of becoming determinative at some point.
They were in the nature of an advisory opinion, however, in that they had not been

preceded by lower court development, were not the subject of the grant of certiorari, and
were not the focus of the parties' briefing, since the issue was the viability of the Frye
test.
37. Daubert,509 U.S. at 593.
38. Id. (quoting E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 645 (1983)).
39. Id. (quoting C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966)).
40. Id. (quoting K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).

OF

41. Id. at 593-94.

42. Id. at 594.
43. Id. at 593.
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to" a fact at issue. The Court described this issue as one of "fit."" Scientific
testimony about phases of the moon, for example, might provide helpful
information about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness in fact was
in dispute, the knowledge would "assist" the jury; but if the issue was whether
an individual "was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night,"
in the manner of, say, a werewolf, the moon-phase evidence would not "fit" the
issue.4" Logically, this werewolf inquiry must be done as a separate and
probably second inquiry, after the evidence is established as scientific.
Furthermore, the Court held that Rule 40346 must govern scientific opinion, just
as it governs all evidence. Thus, even if the evidence had some claim to the label
of science, and even if it arguably fit, if the resulting "probative value" was
"substantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or
danger of misleading the jury, it should be excluded. 47 But the focus, said the
Court, "of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate," so that it was possible for scientific opinion to
be debatable, or even to be opposed to other scientific evidence or opinion,
without being excluded.4"
The Court concluded with a brief mention of "conventional devices" for
testing evidence. 49 It also expressed confidence in trial judges, in "the
capabilities of the jury," and in "the adversary system generally."'
Thus,
"[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence."'" Additionally, "the [trial] court
remains free to direct a judgment ... and likewise to grant summary judgment." 2
These traditional processes, "rather than wholesale exclusion," were the
appropriate safeguards in the case of scientific evidence. 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented in part. The
gist of his opinion was expressed in this conclusion: "I think the Court would
be far better advised in this case to decide only the questions presented, and to

44. Id. at 591.
45. Id.

46. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Daubert,509 U.S. at 595.
Id.
Id. at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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leave the further development of this important area of the law to future cases." 4
"I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges," the Chief Justice went on
to say, "but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific
status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I suspect some of them will
be, too.""5 A judge's duty, he thought, was not "to become [an] amateur
scientist[]."56

With respect to the "general observations" made by the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed that such observations customarily "carry great weight with
lower federal courts."57 The question, however, was whether they should: "they
tend to be not only general, but vague and abstract."5 8 Furthermore, "even if it
were desirable to make 'general observations' not necessary to decide the
questions presented, I cannot subscribe to some of the observations made by the
Court."5 9 This objection extended to the Court's discussion of "appropriate
validation. 60 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned whether the phrase,
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," should "be broken down
into numerous subspecies of expertise, or [whether] its authors simply pick[ed]
general descriptive language covering the sort of expert testimony which courts
have customarily received."'"
This Article argues that the majority's effort to answer prospectively the
question, "what is science?" was not only uncalled for by the case before it but
was also unwise and dysfunctional in its result.
B. General Electric Co. v. Joiner: Do the "Conclusions" Need to Be
Scientific, or Only the "Principlesand Methodology"?
The Joiner62 case concerned experts relied upon to support the plaintiff's
contention that exposure to PCBs had contributed to his cancer. Studies in infant
mice had shown that massive doses of PCBs could cause cancer of a different
variety than Joiner's. A district court held this foundation inadequate to satisfy
the Daubert requirements and excluded the testimony. The Supreme Court
upheld the exclusion.63

54. Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

55. Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

58. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 599 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 599-600 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
62. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
63. Id. at 146.
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The gist of the Supreme Court's reasoning was that this kind of trial court
decision about admissibility could be reversed only for abuse of discretion.64
Furthermore, "[the plaintiff's expert's animal] studies were so dissimilar to the
facts presented in this litigation that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to have rejected the expert's reliance on them. ' 65 But the Court
went on to describe the way in which a district court might consider "bad"
scientific conclusions inadmissible:
Respondent points to Daubert's language that the "focus, of course,
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions
that they generate." . . . He claims that because the District Court's
disagreement was with the conclusion that the experts drew from the
studies, the District Court committed legal error and was properly
reversed by the Court of Appeals. But conclusions and methodology
are not entirely distinct from one another. Trained experts commonly
extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubertor the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered. That is
what the District Court did here, and we hold that it did not abuse its
66
discretion in so doing.
Justice Stevens again dissented in part. He believed that the Court should
have confined itself to stating that abuse of discretion was the proper standard,
without confusing conclusions with principles and methodology.67 Furthermore,
the record did not include each of the scientific studies upon which the plaintiff
had relied, nor had the district court discussed all of them.68 "Whether a fair
appraisal of either the methodology or the conclusions of Joiner's experts can be
made on the basis of such an incomplete record is a question that I do not feel
prepared to answer.
But for Justice Stevens, the real question was a deeper
one:
The [lower court's] discussion of admissibility is faithful to the dictum
in Daubertthat the reliability inquiry must focus on methodology, not
conclusions. Thus, even though I fully agree with both the District

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 144-45.
Id.
Id. at 146 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 151 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Court's and this Court's explanation of why each of the studies on
which the experts relied was itself unpersuasive, a critical question
remains unanswered: when qualified experts have reached relevant
conclusions on the basis of an acceptable methodology, why are their
opinions inadmissible? Daubertquite clearly forbids trialjudges from
assessing the validity or strength of an expert's scientific conclusions,
which is a matter for the jury. Because I am persuaded that the
difference between methodology and conclusions is just as categorical
as the distinction between means and ends, I do not think the statement
that "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another," is either accurate or helps us answer the difficult
admissibility question presented by this record. In any event, it bears
emphasis that the Court has not held that it would have been an abuse
of discretion to admit the expert testimony.... And nothing in either
Daubertor the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district judge to
reject an expert's conclusions and keep them from the jury when they
fit the facts of the case and are based on reliable scientific
methodology."0

Justice Stevens would have remanded the case without deciding it.7
The controversy about conclusions and their relationship to principles and
methodology is indicative of the confused state of the law of expert opinion.
Arguably, it is dangerous to throw out a result-a conclusion-that follows from
proper reasoning simply because it seems outlandish.7 2 For that matter, it may
be difficult for the non-scientist to tell whether a scientist has created "too great
an analytical gap." Accepted scientific opinion at one point in history had the
sun traveling around the earth, and it seems unlikely that a Newtonian analysis
of falling apples could have persuaded a papal curia to think differently.73 The

70. Id. at 154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 151 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. This holistic method of decision is vulnerable to bias. For example,
"anchoring" is a psychological fallacy that consists of clinging to early conclusions and

failing to adjust them for new data that point to a new conclusion because the older
conclusion is preferred. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: HeuristicsandBiases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); DAVID CRUMP, HOW TO

§
2.02(C) (2002). On the other hand, holistic approaches can be important heuristics for
REASON: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY

detecting error in deductive logic. The point is that it must be consulted with skepticism.
Id. § 2.03(B); DOUGLAS WALTON, A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF FALLACY ch. 1 (1995).
73. The reference is, first, to Newton, who is said to have deduced the principle of
gravitation after observing the fall of an apple. WILLIAM STUCKLEY, MEMOIRS OF SIR
ISAAC

NEWTON'S LIFE 19-20 (1752) (Taylor & Francis ed., 1936). Second, Galileo was

convicted by the papal curia of heresy for allegedly maintaining the concept that the earth
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lazy mind might tend to see too great an analytical gap between apples and
astronomy. And in the next case-Kumho Tire-it is arguable that that is what
the Supreme Court did.

C. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael: Generalizingthe "General
Observations"
The claim in Kumho74 was that the defendant's tire was defective. The
plaintiffs expert, Carlson, offered the conclusion that a defect had caused the
inner steel-belted carcass to separate from the tread.75 Carlson's method and
principles were confusing. First, he said that if the separation was not caused by
a kind of misuse called "overdeflection," then ordinarily its cause was a tire
defect." Second, he said that if a tire has been subjected to sufficient
overdeflection to cause a separation, it should reveal certain physical
symptoms." Third, he explained his methodology: where he did not find at least
two of four physical signs, he concluded that a manufacturing or design defect
had caused the separation."8 The situation was further complicated by the
presence of the questioned physical symptoms to a limited degree, but Carlson
explained why, in each instance, the symptoms were neither significant or
indicative ofoverdeflection.79 Therefore, Carlson concluded that because the tire
did not bear at least two of the overdeflection symptoms, overdeflection had not
caused the blowout, and a defect must have done so.80
The district court examined Carlson's methodology in light of the
reliability-related factors that Dauberthad mentioned, including testability, peer
review or publication, rate of error, and degree of acceptance." The court
conceded that there might be widespread acceptance of a "visual-inspection
method," but it found insufficient indications of the reliability of Carlson's

moved about the sun. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 309. Third, the connection between
particles such as the earth and the apple, which obviously displayed "too great an
analytical gap" for the papal curia to traverse, was developed by both Galileo and
Newton, see RONALD LANE REESE, UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 173 (Keith Dodson & Beth
Wilbur eds., 2000), and it helped explain Kepler's laws of planetary motion. See id. at
244-54. The point is that whether an inference bridges too great an analytical gap is a
difficult question for a court trying to perform amateur science, as the court that

convicted Galileo demonstrated.
74. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

75. Id. at 143.
76. Id. at 144.
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id. at 144-45.
80. Id. at 145.
81. Id.
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analysis.12 Pursuant to Daubert,the district court excluded Carlson's evidence. 3
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that the
evidence should have been admitted. 4
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's reversal and reinstated
the district court's decision excluding the evidence. s5 It did so, in part, on the
basis of the abuse of discretion standard, 6 but it carried the issue far beyond that
principle. In fact, the Kumho opinion, like Daubert,is remarkable for the degree
to which the Court decided questions not presented by the record. First, the
Court decided that Rule 702 "makes no relevant distinction between 'scientific'
knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge. It makes clear that
any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony." 7
Furthermore, "[w]e concede that the Court in Daubertreferred only to 'scientific
knowledge.' But as the Court there said, it referred to 'scientific' testimony
'because that [wa]s the nature of the expertise at issue."'8 8 It would prove
"difficult, if not impossible" for judges to distinguish between "scientific"
knowledge and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge, and there was no
"convincing need" to make such distinctions.8 9 Therefore, said the Court, "[w]e
conclude that Daubert'sgeneral principles apply to the expert matters described
in Rule 702. "9o
In making these observations, the Court did not recount the sharp lines it
had drawn in Daubert. There, in black and white, the Court had explained its
holding by reference to falsifiability: "this methodology is what distinguishes
science from other fields of human inquiry."9 Having made this "distinction"
a matter of emphasis in Daubert, the Kumho Court, with surprising facility,
reached the conclusion that no distinction was necessary.9 2 The Court's
reasoning that "[t]here is no clear line that divides" the one (science) from the
others (technical or"other specialized" knowledge)93 also provided only dubious
support for its conclusion. The absence of a "clear line," presumably, did not
necessarily mean that there was no distinction at all; frequently, in fact, it is the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 146.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
See id. at 158.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.

91. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).

92. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-48.
93. Id. at 148.
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Court's duty to make distinctions where there are no clear lines.9" The Court's
conclusion that there was no "convincing need" for such a distinction rested
primarily upon the observation that both types of experts rely upon "specialized
theory" that is "confessedly foreign" to the judiciary.95 These superficial
resemblances seem a gossamer basis for dispensing with distinctions.
Nevertheless, the Court reached the result that way: "[w]e conclude that
Daubert's general principles apply to the expert matters described in Rule
702." 96

Next, the Court took another logical leap. Because Daubert,in analyzing
scientific testimony, had set out four factors, those four factors should apply,
also, to other kinds of specialized knowledge. Thus, testability, peer review and
publication, rate of error, and general acceptance all were factors to be applied
not just to scientific testimony, but to other kinds of evidence governed by Rule
702.9'

Having thus stated that Daubertapplies even to non-Daubertwitnesses, the
Court backtracked:
We agree with the Solicitor General that "[tlhe factors identified in
Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability,
depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise,
and the subject of his testimony." The conclusion, in our view, is that
we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert,nor can we now do
so for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of
evidence. Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the
particular case at issue.9"

At this point in the opinion, the Supreme Court had stated that Daubert'scriteria
were pertinent in assessing reliability, but might not be pertinent in assessing
reliability. The Court went on to emphasize the flexibility of the Daubert
holding, which would permit an expert to testify even though the opinion had
never been the subject of peer review, for example.99 The Court then introduced
two examples-an engineer and a perfume sniffer:

94. In his concurrence in Bendix Autolite Corp.v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888
(1988), for example, Justice Scalia aptly described the Court's task as analogous to
deciding "whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." Bendix, 486
U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
95. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148-49.
96. Id. at 149.
97. Id. at 149-50.
98. Id. at 150.
99. Id. at 151.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss1/6

12

Crump: Crump: Trouble with Daubert-Kumho:
2003]

THE TROUBLE WITH DAUBERT

[S]ome of Daubert'squestions can help to evaluate the reliability even
of experience-based testimony. In certain cases, it will be appropriate
for the trial judge to ask, for example, how often an engineering
expert's experience-based methodology has produced erroneous
results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the relevant
engineering community. Likewise, it will at times be useful to ask
even of a witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say,
a perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff,
whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would
recognize as acceptable. We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a
schematism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain
kinds of questions to certain kinds of experts. Life and the legal cases
that it generates are too complex to warrant so definitive a match."
Even given this amorphous standard, said the Court, Daubert's "gatekeeping
requirement" was "importan[t]."''
The Court's method of dealing with the inherent contradictions in what it
had said was to blur the lines: "we conclude that the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining
whether particular expert testimony is reliable."' 1 2 And if that was not confusing
enough, the Court added: "a trial court should consider the specific factors
where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of
identified in Daubert
'1' °3
testimony.
expert
The Court finally shifted to analyzing Carlson's testimony regarding the
allegedly defective tire. The Court emphasized that the basis for Carlson's
conclusion was not simply "the general theory that, in the absence of evidence
of abuse, a defect will normally have caused a tire separation. Rather, the expert
employed a more specific theory to establish the existence (or absence) of such
abuse. Carlson testified precisely that in the absence of at least two of four signs
of abuse, . . . he concludes that a defect caused the separation."' 04 Thus, the

expert explained the steps he had followed in a way that the jury could probably
evaluate as readily as the judge. The Court, however, excluded the evidence
without focusing on the jury's competence. Perhaps the most significant
justification for the Supreme Court's holding was the same as that for the district
court, "that 'none' of the Daubertfactors, including that of 'general acceptance'

100. Id.

101. Id. at 152.
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. Id. at 154.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 6
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

in the relevant expert community, indicated that Carlson's testimony was
reliable."'0 °
The Court could have taken a different route, one more consistent with
Daubert's holding that scientific evidence is distinguishable. It could have held
that non-scientific experts are not subject to the four-part Daubert factors. It
could have recognized that what it called "experienced based" experts derive and
express their opinions in a manner quite different from scientific reasoning. The
perfume sniffer, for example, uses observation as the basis of expertise,
observing just as a bystander observes an automobile accident. Arguably, it
makes no more sense to ask the expert perfume sniffer about methods and
principles for distinguishing perfumes than it does to ask the accident witness
what methods and principles are used to distinguish a Ford from a Chevrolet, or
a red light from a green one. Asking a bystander whether the distinction between
green and red is testable, peer reviewed, subject to a known error rate, or
generally accepted is analogous to asking the same questions of the perfume
sniffer.
Furthermore, the perfume sniffer does not purport to use science or theory.
In assessing the credibility of such an expert, the jury is in approximately the
position it occupies whenjudging the testimony of any witness who has observed
a detail through one of the five senses.
D. The 2000 Amendment to Rule 702: How the ProcrusteanBed
Became Cast in the Concrete of an Enactment
In 1999, the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence proposed an amendment to Rule 702. The amendment has
been referred to as "effectively codify[ing]" the Kumho approach:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if(l) the testimony is based upon sufficientfacts or data, (2)
the testimony is the product of reliableprinciples and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principlesand methods reliably to the
facts of the case.'o6

105. Id. at 156.
106. FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added). See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S.
RAEDER & DAVID CRUMP, SUPPLEMENT TO EVIDENCE:

CASES, MATERIALS AND

PROBLEMS 46 (1999) (asserting that the amendment effectively codifies Kumho).
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This amendment became effective on December 1, 2000.'07
The thesis of this Article is that this amendment was undesirable. First, for
reasons that appear below, it was undesirable to codify Kumho's adoption of
Daubert, because Daubert reflects an inappropriately narrow conception of
science. 8 Furthermore, an effort to codify a case with as many contradictory
nuances as Kumho, when it is based upon another opinion that is based upon the
Rule being amended, is likely to fail to capture all of those nuances.
And perhaps a bigger problem lies in the application of the added portion
of the Rule to experience-based experts. Consider a dirt-under-the-fingernails
expert such as a garage mechanic, who testifies about carburetor malfunctions
or the reasonable cost of repairs and is asked whether the underlying "principles"
were "peer reviewed," or are "falsifiable," or produce known "error rates." Try
asking the same questions of a teenager testifying to the meaning of youth-gang
terminology. Furthermore, imagine the application of the amended Rule to the
perfume sniffer:
Q: Mr. Perfume Sniffer, the Supreme Court says that I must first ask
you whether (1) your testimony identifying perfumes by the nasal
method is based upon "sufficient facts or data."
A: Well, I sniffed the perfume. Is that "sufficient facts or data?"
Q: And (2) 1 have to ask you whether your testimony is the product of
"reliable principles and methods."
A: Look. I smelled Chanel No. 5. I know I smelled Chanel No. 5.
Q: And did you "apply the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case?"
A: I used my nose. That's all I can do.
The Rule requires consideration of these criteria, ostensibly for every expert
witness and, unlike Daubert and Kumho, it does not itself express any
flexibility.19

The Advisory Committee's note reflects wishful thinking about this issue:
Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience
alone ... may not provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony.
In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for
a great deal of reliable expert testimony ....
If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then
the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and

107. FED. R. EVID. 702.
108. See infra Parts 11-III.
109. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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subjective and controversial the expert's inquiry, the more likely the
testimony should be excluded as unreliable.. .. "'
Judges and lawyers can be forgiven, however, if they focus upon the language
of the Rule, which is positive law, and which unfortunately requires a
demonstration that the testimony "is the product of reliable principles and
methods," not merely of "experience.'"" The Rule text, of course, overrides the
Advisory Committee's note." 2 And the Rule requires what it requires of every
expert witness, however outlandish that may be. Furthermore, the perfume
sniffer cannot reproduce objective indicia of the opinion in the courtroom, and,
therefore, in the terminology of the Advisory Committee, offers "subjective and
controversial" opinions of the kind that the Advisory Committee says should be
especially likely to be "excluded as unreliable." ' 3 The Procrustean bed created
by Daubertand Kumho, thus, has been cast in the concrete of an enacted Rule.
The sections that immediately follow will emphasize expert scientific
evidence. They will consider whether the Supreme Court's definition of science
is too narrow. The primary focus is on Daubertrather than Kumho. But in later
sections, dealing with methodology and principles, the Article will consider the
difficulties inherent in the Kumho holding as well.
II. WHAT IS SCIENCE?

A. Scientific Method: Observation, Concept, and QuantitativeTheory
What is science, and what makes a proposition more or less "scientific"?
In this Part, I shall argue that there are at least three parts of the scientific
endeavor: observation, concept, and quantitative theory. "4 Throughout the
history of science, different ones of these three issues have been pushed to the
forefront, and they have been the battleground of the philosophy of science.' 5

110. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's notes.
111. See FED. R. EvID. 702.
112. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 ("We interpret
the legislatively-enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute.").
113. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes.
114. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 301-15 (discussing the meaning of science and
the characteristics of a good scientific theory).
115. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 301-15.
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1. Science as Observation: The Empiricists or Positivists
To some philosophers, the empiricists or logical positivists, observations are
the defining characteristic of science." 6 In this view, a concept or theory-for
example, Boyle's Law relating to the pressure, temperature, and volume of a
gas"'-always is inaccurate. In fact, this criticism is literally true of any
scientific theory. To use the same illustration, Boyle's Law applies only to an
"ideal" gas, a hypothetical concept that does not really exist but was invented by
theoreticians so that the numbers for Boyle's Law would work out."' (Boyle's
Law is that P, x V/T, = P, x V,/T,, or the pressure of a gas multiplied by the
volume and divided by the temperature is constant.)' 9
For empirical philosophers, science consists of measurement, observation,
and experimentation.' 0 A slavishly literal empiricist might say that a concept
such as Boyle's Law, which produces only approximations when used with real
gases such as oxygen or ammonia, is unscientific because experimentation
proves that although it gives approximations, it always gives false values. It
ultimately requires empirical observation anyway, to tell what the real numbers
are. Although few empiricists would push the primacy of observation to the
point of rejecting Boyle's Law, this example may show why the empiricists must,
at some point, compromise with conceptualists if we are to avoid conceiving of
science merely as a jumble of unrelated observations.
Thus, the empiricists see experiment as the core of science.
Experimentation or observation, with measurement, can exhibit consistency with
(and inductively support) a theoretical relationship, or it can disprove (or
"falsify") it. This relatively narrow view limits science to that which is
"falsifiable."' 2 ' The British-Austrian philosopher Sir Karl Popper has been a
leading proponent of this view of "generating hypotheses" that can be "tested"
empirically, or of science as defined by "falsifiability." The famous quotation
from Popper that appears at the beginning of this Article is the linchpin of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert.'2 5

116. MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN&
SCIENTIFIC METHOD

ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND

chs. 11-12 (1934); David Bohm, On the Problem of Truth and

Understandingin Science, in THE

CRITICAL APPROACH TO SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY ch.

14 (Mario Bunge ed., 1964); POPPER, supra note 40, at 37. See generally CRUMP, supra
note 72, at 301-03 (relating observation, concept, and computation).
117. REESE, supra note 73, at 599-601; ALEXANDER KOLIN, PHYSICS: ITS LAWS,
IDEAS AND METHODS 261, 295-98 (1950).

118. REESE, supra note 73, at 599-601.
119. REESE, supra note 73, at 599-601.
120. See supra note 116 and authorities therein cited.
121. See supra note I and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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2. Science as Concept or Theory: The Rationalists
But others disagree with the empiricists, seeing the core of science as
concept rather than observation.'
A series of observations of a gas such as
oxygen or ammonia would allow us to provide charts of the relationships among
pressure, volume, and temperature, but if the strict empiricist is correct, we could
not predict other data points. We could not even interpolate between observed
data points, because this would require a concept or theory. Furthermore, unless
linked by a concept, our measurements would remain as nothing more than raw
data. Boyle's Law, by contrast, provides a model, or a concept, that organizes
the data, even if it is imperfect.
Sir Isaac Newton, for example, was a rationalist rather than an empiricist.2 4
He deduced numerous relationships in the physical world, producing what now
is referred to as Newtonian mechanics, as a conceptual exercise, although subject
to verification. While recognizing the need for revision if the concepts he
postulated proved empirically wrong, he saw science largely as concept or logic,
or as rational rather than purely empirical. 2 ' Newton's famous statement,
"[h]ypotheses non fingo," or "I don't generate hypotheses," which is at the
beginning of this Article,2 6 clashes sharply with Popper's theory that science is
hypotheses and testing. Newton
did not generate hypotheses because he deduced
27
his ideas conceptually.

3. Science as Mathematical Relationship: The Quantitative Theorists
In addition to observation and concept, there is a third part of the
puzzle-quantitative theory. 28 There are those who say that formal quantitative
theory is the heart of science. You cannot understand a phenomenon, they insist,
unless you can assign numbers to its inputs and derive numbers for its results.2 9
Boyle's Law, for all its imperfections, fits this conception.

123. See generally authorities cited supra note 116 (relating observation, concept,
and theory). See also DONALD PALMER, DOES THE CENTER HOLD?: AN INTRODUCTION
TO WESTERN PHILOSOPHY chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining rationalist and empiricist
epistemologies); GUNNAR SKIRBEKK & NILS GIUE, A HISTORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT
FROM ANCIENT GREECE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY chs. 10, 12, 26 (7th ed. 2000)

(same).
124. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 303.
125. CRUMP, supra note 72, at 303.

126. See supranote 3 and authorities therein cited.
127. The story of the falling apple illustrates the manner in which Newton
proceeded by thinking rather than experiment. See supra note 73.
128. See, e.g., CRUMP, supra note 72, at 301-03.
129. CRUMP, supra note 72, at 301-03.
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4. Science as Differing from Daubert in Requiring Accommodation of
All Three Criteria: Observation, Concept, and Computation
The point is this: in some measure, science consists of all three of these
factors. Few philosophers of science today would regard any of the three
ingredients as irrelevant. 3 ° A concept that does not fit the facts at all is not
useful, and neither is a jumble of raw empirical data correlated by no concept,
however falsifiable they may be. Furthermore, neither a theory nor a set of
numbers has any meaning unless to some extent it can be treated comparatively,
which is to say quantitatively. The philosophers differ primarily in how they
emphasize these ingredients.
And this, in turn, is the trouble with Daubert-Kumho. The cases do not
express any recognition of the other two ingredients in the triad, concept and
computation. Instead, they seem to make everything depend on falsifiability,
which is to say, on observation.'
By thus choosing to base its approach to
science on a single short passage from a single philosopher, even one as
prominent as Popper,' the Supreme Court ii Daubertmay have reduced the
meaning of science to only a part of itself. In the next section of this Article, we
shall examine the ironic result, which is that a straightforward application of the
Daubert factors seems to label as unscientific many kinds of theories that seem
to be valid and useful.
B. The Consequences of Using Falsifiabilityas the Testfor Science:
From Biological Taxonomy andRelativity Theory to Newton, Einstein,
andFreud
Popper's theory of falsifiability, that experimental verification is the
defining element of science, 13 would make some branches of what is thought of
as science unscientific, if applied with rigorous logic. Consider the example of
biological classification or taxonomy. It is difficult to "prove" observationally
that a whale is a mammal, or that a spider is not an insect. We can "prove" these
facts by resort to definitional characteristics, such as that mammals are warmblooded and that insects have six legs, but this is merely a concept, not falsifiable
in itself; it might be equally possible to construct a definition by which a whale
34
is a fish.

130. CRUMP, supra note 72, at 301-03; see also KOLIN, supra note 117, at 5
("[A]quisition of knowledge about nature is not accomplished by perception alone. It is
achieved by a combination of perception and reasoning.").
131. See supra Part I.
132. See supra note I and authorities therein cited.
133. See supra note I and authorities therein cited.
134. Cf MICHAEL RUSE, BUT IS IT SCIENCE?: THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION ON
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1. Does Daubert Disqualify the Biological Taxonomist?
The concept of a "mammal" or an "insect" is like all concepts: it is
designed to show relationships, and the test of its validity, arguably, should be
whether it is useful for that purpose,'35 not whether it is capable of experimental
proof. As constructed in Daubert,Rule 702 admissibility depends on whether
the expert's opinion could "assist" the jury, and the biological taxonomist's
theory about mammals does seem to assist in understanding them. The utility of
the concept is that we can predict other characteristics of whales and trace their
evolution better by treating them as mammals.' 36 Still, our classification of a
whale as a mammal remains conceptual, and it is emphatically not
experimentally verifiable. It is not possible to falsify the statement that a whale
is "like" a horse, when the whale is like a horse in some respects and unlike it in
others. A straightforward application of Daubert,therefore, seems to call for
exclusion, even if the opinion might assist the jury.
Is the classificatory biologist, then, wrong in claiming to be a scientist? Or
is Popper's theory wrong? And now, a key legal question: if an empiricist says
the taxonomist isn't a "scientist," does this mean that the taxonomist cannot
testify in court? Under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Daubert,perhaps it
does!
In fact, this difficulty with Popper's philosophy is so well developed that it
is hard to justify the Supreme Court's uncritical acceptance of its briefly stated
doctrine of falsifiability. The difficulty is explained in college texts. For
example:
But what about the statement, "the average temperature on the surface
of the earth when the human race is extinct, will be 70'C"? This
statement is, in principle, not falsifiable since no one will be alive to
falsify it (assuming that no other intelligent creatures replace human
beings). But is this statement, then, cognitively meaningless, and not
scientific? Scientists would probably be reluctant to draw this
conclusion: they would hardly think that such statements are
37
scientifically meaningless. 1

THE CREATION/EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY

ch. 16 (1988) (discussing this question).

135. Cf 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, Philosophy of Science 667-76, Philosophy
of Nature 678-92 (1989) (including the observation that while the British philosophy of
science, exemplified by Popper, depends heavily on falsifiability, the American view
instead has emphasized "what works").
136. See generally CARL JAY BAJEMA, NATURAL SELECTION THEORY: FROM THE
SPECULATIONS OF THE GREEKS TO THE QUANTITATIVE

MEASUREMENT OF THE

BIOMETRICIANS (1983) (discussing the history of evolutionary theories).
137. SKIRBEKK & GILUE, supra note 123, at 429.
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This shows that it is problematic to identify the distinction between
statements that are falsifiable-in-principle and statements that are not falsifiablein-principle with the distinction between science and non-science, and even that
between cognitively meaningful and cognitively meaningless statements. Popper
himself recognized this difficulty and compromised with rationalism. He even
used the term "critical rationalism" to refer to his own position. 9 Deduced
specific statements were not to be tested against reality. 4 This assumption
legitimizes branches of knowledge such as logic, mathematics, or game theory
that are not falsifiable as a matter of principle; without it, with only the
falsifiability criterion, the credentials of a deductive expert in these fields would
disappear. Popper saw science as dialectic, and he took a pragmatic approach:
repeated experiences of many people can provide the needed objective
foundation. 4 ' Furthermore, he pointed in a direction opposite from that of
Kumho by maintaining that non-scientific disciplines (history was his example)
could not be tested by the same criteria.'42 Later, other philosophers, for
example, Thomas Kuhn, pointed out other arguable flaws in Popper's
falsifiability theory."'
2. From Tachyons to the Laws of Mechanics: Could Rationalists Like
Einstein or Newton Testify under Daubert?
Another test of Popper's philosophy is the relativity construct of tachyons.
Nothing we know of can move faster than the speed of light, and relativity theory
suggests that creating such a fast-moving object is impossible, because the
energy required to accelerate it would exceed all of the energy that exists in the
universe. This concept, however, has led relativity theorists to postulate the
existence of "tachyons," which travel faster than light ("tachy" is taken from a
Greek word meaning fast). Just as nothing else can exceed the speed of light,
tachyons cannot slow down to light speed, because the energy they would give
off would exceed what the universe could absorb.
Many of the predictions of relativity theory have been verified by
observation, but we have never seen a tachyon. It is difficult to catch them. We
may never observe them. Does this conclusion mean that theories contemplating

139. See SKIRBEKK & GUE, supra note 123, at 430-31.
140. See SKIRBEKK & GlUE, supra note 123, at 430-3 1.
141. See SKIRBEKK & GlUE, supra note 123, at 430-31.
142. See SKIRBEKK & GliuE, supra note 123, at 431-32; see also KARL RAIMUND
POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HIsTORICISM (1957).

143. See SKIRBEKK & GluE, supra note 123, at 433-35. Kuhn's view included the
insight that scientific truth is relative to the paradigm or model with which the theorist
worked. A paradigm shift changed the reality and hence the falsifiability of statements

made within the previous paradigm.
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tachyons are unscientific, under Popper's theory? If so, were all of the
predictions from relativity, including those that since have been experimentally
observed,'44 "unscientific" when Albert Einstein first conceived them?
The point is a simple one: a narrowly insistent confinement of science to
empiricism, such as the one that emerges from a literal reading of Daubert,
would destroy a great deal of what seems to fit a fair definition of science.
Newton's mechanics, including his equations that involve mass, velocity, and
momentum, were conceived originally as a matter of logic or concept, and not
by empirical observation.'45 Would a court, in Newton's time, have felt
constrained to exclude the greatest scientist of all time from testifying, on the
ground that his reasoning was conceptual? Perhaps tachyons make a more
poignant example, because although they are derived directly from relativity
theory, much of which has been empirically verified, no one is likely to be able
to devise an experiment that will support or falsify their existence. Would a
court of Einstein's day, therefore, be forced to exclude him from the courtroom,
if it applied the Daubert criteria?
In response to this question, Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried has devised
a wonderful hypothetical, with the suggestion that if the result is the exclusion
of Einstein's testimony, that ruling is no disaster:
I'm not troubled by precluding Einstein from testifying about
tachyons. I'll grant you that last week on Star Trek-The Next
Generation, Picard did use a network of tachyon beams to detect
cloaked Romulan warships. However, that's in another century far in
the future when they really have evidence that tachyons exist. If
Einstein proposed testifying about tachyons today and another
credentialed expert tried to link a tort defendant's industrial operations
144. See KOLIN, supra note 117, at 840-41 (describing the Michelson-Morley
experiment); id. at 856-57 (describing experimental verifications). For technical
accuracy, it is necessary to add that Popper's falsifiability criterion requires only
falsifiability "in principle," not falsifiability with today's technology. In other words,
science may include those statements, including assertions of the existence of tachyons,
that we may some day be able to falsify with yet-nonexistent technology. See SKIRBEKK
& GLUE, supra note 123, at 429. But for three reasons, this distinction does not seem to
be a viable ingredient of the Daubert reasoning. First, it is unlikely that most judges
would be able to apply it. Cf Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601
(1983) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Rehnquist's confession that, "I am at
a loss to know what is meant" by "falsifiability"). Second, it would produce the
nonsensical result of legitimizing, as science, statements that we have no way of testing,
precisely because we cannot test them but might some day be able to. Third, whether a
statement is falsifiable "in principle" will frequently be a matter of debate. We may
discover some day, for example, that tachyons are inherently uncertain and that there are
principled reasons why we may never discover them.
145. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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with tachyon interferences causing illnesses, I think that ajudge would
and should bar the testimony.' 46
I agree with this prediction. I wonder, however, whether it shows the range of
possible uses of the testimony. The issue in the Imwinkelried conjecture
arguably is the "fit" of the tachyon testimony, not its "reliability.' ' 47 This is so
because the cause for exclusion has to do not with whether tachyons exist but
with whether they are known to cause disease (probably not). Thus, it is not
Einstein's opinion about the existence oftachyons that besmirches this evidence,
but rather the second (non-Einsteinian and unknown) witness' opinion that they
are relevant to diseases. (This kind of confusion is endemic to Daubert
hearings.)
I readily grant that it is difficult to come up with an example of a case in
which the determinative issue is whether tachyons exist or not. When faced with
this kind of difficulty, I usually resort to a hypothet about gamblers in Las Vegas.
Two citizens of Nevada have entered into a million-dollar bet about whether
tachyons exist. If they do, the first Nevadan owes the other the money; if they
do not, then vice versa. At trial, the first Nevadan calls Albert Einstein as a
witness. This great scientist's expert opinion (let us say) is that the question is
a close call, but in all probability, from everything he has seen, tachyons do exist.
If these are the claim and the evidence, I believe it is a bit narrow-minded to
exclude the evidence on the ground that we cannot see tachyons and, therefore,
may never be able to falsify them. And I would bet that a court in Nevada,
where bets are a major item of commerce, would want to get to the truth.
Of course, these hypothets are wild. It is easy to say that neither one should
be taken seriously. The difficulty, however, is that these imaginary cases are
used here as examples that may be analogous to real and serious cases.' 48 And
then, the exclusion of scientific evidence because we cannot devise an
experiment to detect the immediate subject matter although we can support it, at
least, as a matter of "appropriate validation," ' 49 is troubling.

146. E-mail from Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried to Professor David Crump
(Mar. 12, 2002, 9:39 a.m.) (copy on file with author).
147. The Daubert Court distinguished between the "validation" of a principle and
its "fit" to the question at hand. A given principle may be perfectly valid but have
nothing to do with the issue before the court. Thus, scientific testimony about phases of
the moon may be valid, but although it may be used to demonstrate probable darkness on
a particular night, it should not be used to demonstrate than an individual behaved
irrationally on that night (the "werewolf' inference). See Daubert,509 U.S. at 591. The
same distinction applies to Professor Imwinkelried's example. The inference that
tachyons exist may be valid, but it may not fit the question at issue because it is not
demonstrably relevant to the etiology of diseases.
148. Such as Daubert,Joiner,and Kumho.
149. Again, appropriate validation should be the overall issue, not such subsidiary
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3. Freud and Dreams: A DaubertNightmare?
Then, there is Freud. If a case concerning nightmares had arisen during
Freud's time, would the Daubertstandard have permitted him to testify? Freud's
seminal book, The Interpretation of Dreams,' ° characterized dreams as

censored, symbolic stories that camouflaged their "latent content," which
expressed unconscious drives that would be too frightening to confront if made
explicit. Many contemporary psychologists have no use for Freud. His work did
not pretend to be predictive, and, therefore, it was not uniformly replicable. But
Freud and his followers created the framework of modem psychology by seeking
to explain the irrational, the disordered, and the unconscious, and he probably
could tell a jury more that might "assist" in understanding dreams, to use the
terminology of Rule 702, than anything else available in his time.'
Freud's elaborate theory of dream process, which is diagramed in Figure
1,152 did depend upon repeated empirical observations of patients in
psychoanalysis, but not in a replicable way. It depended more heavily on Freud's
non-replicable interpretation of those observations. Freud asserted that
psychoanalysis could trace most dreams to sexual issues or, as he put it, to
"erotic wishes." A knife, umbrella, or airplane in a dream, for example, might
really symbolize a penis. A cave or bottle symbolized female genitalia. ' It is
difficult to conceive an experiment that would falsify these'theories. Therefore,
even though Freud might have had much to say that might assist a jury in his
time, Daubertprobably would not have permitted him to say it.

Figure 1

unconscious

Freud and

Day Residue,
Sensory Inputs,
and Life Situation
Fantasies,
Drvs Infantile
Memrnos

Latent
onen

dreams

ream WorkI

q, e
,
condensationSecondary
Qmsor
Cesrojectionab

conscious
Manifest
onen

L preconscious j
matters as the concept of falsifiability. See supra Part I.A.
150. SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (James Strachey ed.,

trans., Basic Books 1955).
151. Cf CRUMP, supra note 72, at 351-54.
152. The diagram is taken from CRUMP, supra note 72, at 352.
153. See generally FREUD, supra note 150.
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In fact, some of Freud's testable hypotheses have been rejected by
observation. His idea that personality development was concentrated in
childhood stages (particularly the "oral" and "anal" stages) is contradicted by
research indicating, instead, that development is lifelong, and his assertion that
gender identity emerges from an "Oedipal complex" (or a five- to six-year-old
child's resolution of sexual attachments to the opposite-gendered parent) is
contradicted by evidence that gender identity emerges much earlier, and emerges
Yet many of Freud's
in households without opposite-gendered parents.'
groundbreaking ideas have survived. Above all, his insight into the irrational,
the disordered, and the unconscious as means of explaining the human mind is
both the framework of modem psychology and a principle that could be of great
value to a jury charged with deciding an issue to which it might be relevant.' 55
Psychologist Richard Evans traces the history of psychology as beginning
with models of the mind that were highly conceptual (Freud and his
contemporaries) and progressing to behavioralism that was empirically replicable
(such as B.F. Skinner's learning theory experiments). Although recognizing that
this sequence is subject to exceptions, Evans notes that today, the pendulum
seems to have swung back to include conceptual studies of the mind, which are
not divorced from empirical support but depend much more on rationalist
modeling.' 56 The sequence is subject to exceptions, but Evans sees this mind-tobehavior-and-back-to-mind-again pattern as the thread of the history of
psychology. Perhaps it is possible that the human mind requires us to adopt a
lesser fidelity to empiricism than Daubertseems to demand, if we are to study
all of it.
Again, I turn to the wisdom supplied by Professor Imwinkelried for
reaction. Perhaps it is too pessimistic to expect that most judges would exclude
Freud's testimony, or for that matter, Einstein's or Newton's. As Professor
Imwinkelried puts it, "I certainly don't think that Daubert mandates [that]
result."'5 And I agree-Daubertshould not be read to mandate that result.
Professor Imwinkelried suggests that the emphasis should be upon the Court's
call for "appropriate validation." Following Professor Risinger, he would have
the court focus specifically upon "the task at hand":
The trial judge isn't supposed to make global judgments about either
a discipline or all of an expert's theories. The only question is whether
there is appropriate validation for the precise theory he or she
contemplates testifying about....

154. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 353.
155. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 353.
156. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 353.
157. E-mail from Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried to Professor David Crump
(Mar. 12, 2002, 9:39 a.m.) (copy on file with author).
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[A]lthough you're probably right that Daubertplaces undue emphasis
on empiricism, you need to give the opinion credit. I like the Court's
reference to "appropriate validation." . . . [In certain kinds of cases
involving testimony about Freud's theories,] proof that the theories are
widely accepted and effective would arguably be "appropriate
validation."
Certainly, in mathematics, rigorous deduction is
"appropriate validation."' 58
Again, I agree. And if Justice Blackmun's opinion had stopped after observing
that appropriate validation should be required, the use of an "appropriate
validation" test would be clearly indicated and possibly more workable than the
current regime.
The trouble, however, is that Justice Blackmun translated this phrase,
"appropriate validation," into his four suggested criteria of falsifiability, peer
review, error rate, and general acceptance, with a "key" factor being testability
or falsifiability. "9 And the further trouble is, even if Freud's dream theories can
be propped up by the overall test of appropriate validation, the existence of the
dream censor and the meaning of secondary elaboration are falsifiable only if
one uses an artificially generous definition of that term. Furthermore, inKumho,
the Court held that a trial judge sometimes can look to an entire discipline to
determine whether a specific opinion should be excluded. 6 ' Nevertheless,
Professor Imwinkelried's suggestion may provide the solution to the problem.
If courts were to emphasize the overall question of appropriate validation, rather
than relying on strict falsifiability, the law of expert opinion might be more
sensible. A trial court conscientiously applying the Daubert"factors" would not
be drawn so easily into nonsensical results such as excluding fingerprint
identifications 6' if it sought only "appropriate validation." But doesn't the
actual contrary holding reached by one court show how, despite Professor
Imwinkleried's hopeful predictions, DaubertandKumho are signposts that direct
judges frequently toward silly results? The problem here, I fear, is that the
reverberating clang of the four factors, particularly the key factor of falsifiability,
drowns everything else out.
Fingerprint identification easily can be

158. Id.; see generally D. Michael Risinger, Defining the "Task at Hand":
NonscientificScience After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE LAW REV.
767 (2000).
159. See supra Part I.A.
160. Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999).
161. See supra notes 10- 11 and accompanying text.
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"appropriately validated"' 62 even though questions about its falsifiability, peer
review, and error rates produce a morass.'63
4. Howard Gardner's Seven Intellectual Competencies: Excludable
under Daubert?
Howard Gardner is a modem example of this mind-to-behavior-and-backto-mind development. Contrary to the establishment view of educational
psychology, Gardner rejects any general concept or measurement of intelligence.
"I place no particular premium on the word intelligence," he explains, "but I do
place great importance on ... various human faculties."' 6 4 Gardner identifies
(1) linguistic, (2) musical, (3)
seven distinct "intellectual competencies":
logical-mathematical, (4) spatial, (5) bodily kinesthetic, (6) interpersonal
intelligence (or personal intellectual competence in social interaction), and (7)
intrapersonal intelligence (or competence with respect to one's own personality).
His argument is that there is no one phenomenon of intelligence, although people
differ in these seven competencies.' 65
Gardner does not defend his theory with quantitative data, or indeed with
uniformly testable reasoning. 66 Critics point out, furthermore, that general
intelligence testing shows a significant correlation with high competence in each
of his seven models, suggesting that there is, in fact, a general intelligence
concept that unifies all of Gardner's types. 167 Gardner responds by68declining to
accept the correlation, on the ground that current tests are biased.
Does Gardner, then, have a point (and if so, should the law acknowledge
it)? The idea of multiple intellectual competencies is intuitively appealing.
Certainly, we all have known logical people with relatively little in the way of
social skills, musicians who were not very logical, and linguistic people who
were not good at introspection. Does common experience, then, provide an
empirical basis for Professor Gardner's seven-part model, just as everyday

162. For example, by reference to the authorities cited by the court in United States
v. Lera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
163. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.

164.

THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE

HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND:

INTELLIGENCES x-xii, 17, 60-61, 278 (1983).
165. See id. at x-xii; 17,60-61,278; STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASUREOF MAN
27-28 (1981) (asserting that "determinist arguments for ranking people according to a
single scale of intelligence ... have recorded little more than social prejudices").
166. See RICHARD J. HERRNESTEIN &CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE 7, 151-

52, 280-81, 290, 483-84, 625-30 (1994);

JOSEPH

D.

MATARAZZO, WECHSLER'S

(1972); see also CRUMP, supra
note 72, at 374-77 (discussing these authorities and the meaning of intelligence).
167. See authorities cited supra note 166.
168. See authorities cited supra note 166.
MEASUREMENT AND APPRAISAL OF ADULT INTELLIGENCE
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experience supports the law of gravity? If so, the question remains whether
everyday experience sufficiently refutes the concept of general intelligence so
that the law should recognize the idea of modeling specific competencies, as an
alternative.
The Daubertapproach, rigorously applied, seems to signify that Gardner's
opinions would have to be censored in a courtroom. 169 A rationalist might accept
Gardner's "radical" (his word) description as scientific, but an empiricist would
be less likely to. 7 0 And what would happen if Gardner were offered as a rebuttal
expert, for the purpose of raising questions about mainstream theory? The
Supreme Court has not recognized a difference in the standard for rebuttal
witnesses,' 7 ' and, therefore, the censorship of Gardner's opinions would seem
to remain the rule. This is particularly an ironic result given the influence that
Gardner has had upon the educational establishment and upon mainstream
psychologists. Gardner might well be able to assist a jury, but Daubert seems
to mean that it would never hear him.

Il. THEORIES AND THEIR LIMITS: WHAT MAKES A GOOD
SCIENTIFIC MODEL?
A. What Kind of Theory or Model (DoesIt Depend on the Use to
Which the Concept Is to Be Put)?
Next, we shall compare Daubertnotjust to the concept of science generally,
but to the acceptability of particular scientific theories. Much of science consists
of deriving "models" from observations or experiments.'
Boyle's Law, as we
have seen, is a concept or model superimposed upon our observations of gases. '
Likewise, the "meatball" vision of an atom, with spherical electrons orbiting a
nucleus composed of bigger spheres that are protons and neutrons, is a model.
It is useful in some ways, inaccurate in others. 74 Models help us, first, to

169. See supra Part I.A.
170. See supra Part II.A.
171. On the contrary, Kumho says that the Daubertapproach applies to all expert
witnesses. See supra Part I.C.
172. "In his analysis of a real system, a physicist constructs a well-defined model
of the system and addresses the model." ROBERT K. ADAIR, THE PHYSICS OF BASEBALL
1-2 (2d ed. 1994).
173. See supra Part II.A. 1.
174. It also is known as the "Bohr model" model. See REESE, supra note 73, at
163. A slightly more sophisticated version, the plum pudding model, conceives of the
electron as a charge mass or cloud. Id. at 763. A much more sophisticated model is
furnished by quantum mechanics. Id. at ch. 27.
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understand the 75phenomenon that they represent, and second, to predict its
characteristics.1
1. Understanding Models and Their Limits
Thus, modeling is a basic scientific endeavor. A "map" is a symbolic
drawing of the physical area it represents. The map is not the territory, however,
and the model is not the physical reality.1 76 Models are to physical reality as
maps are to the earth. Good maps distort less than bad ones, but all maps (and
all models) distort. For example, the standard Mercator projection map, showing
177
the earth as a rectangle, enlarges Greenland because it is closer to the pole.
Other projections, keeping areas consistent in size, also are possible, but they
chop the earth into pieces, and they distort shapes in other ways.
Likewise, a road map fails to capture the shape, size, and appearance of
intersections, so that it is possible to read a map accurately and yet miss a
connection. In the same way, the "meatball" atom, even as it helps us to see the
nucleus in relation to electrons, is inferior to a model recognizing electrons in
shells or layers, or better yet, in slurred clouds.77 Furthermore, electrons
sometimes form cloverleaf or airplane-propeller shapes, rather than spheres.
But then, there is the principle referred to as Occam's Razor: other things
being equal, the model with the fewest number of arbitrary elements ordinarily
is preferable. 179 The model must accurately reflect reality to a useful degree, and
to the extent it does not, it becomes inappropriate for some situations. But of
two models, one containing a large amount of complexity and another less, the
simpler is preferable if it describes the territory equally well. This principle
sometimes is referred to as "Occam's Razor,"' ° after the philosopher William
of Occam.' 8'
Then too, despite Occam's Razor, some phenomena require multiple
models.'82 The map-of-the-earth problem mentioned above is an example. A
serious geographer might want to keep several projections around for
consultation in different situations. Newtonian mechanics, or the classical
physics of motion in which matter and energy are conserved and F = ma (force

175. See ADAIR, supra note 172, at 2.
176. See ADAIR, supra note 172, at 2.
177. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 828 (2d ed. 1995)
(defining "Mercator projection").
178. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
179. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 307-12..
180. See THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO OCKHAM ch. 5 (1999).
181. See id. at 5. See generallyCRUMP, supra note 72, at 307, 311-12 (discussing
the relationship of Occam's Razor to other criteria for scientific modeling).
182. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 307-08.
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equals mass times acceleration), works well in most earthly conditions but poorly
in other conditions, e.g., extreme gravitational fields, in which effects predicted
by the theory of relativity become significant. 8 3 In the latter situation, we need
a different model.
In other words, models have limits, and understanding the limits is as
important as understanding the model. At extreme pressures, Boyle's Law may
cease to operate even as an approximation.8 4 Likewise, at very high or at cold
temperatures, the gas may undergo a phase change (oxygen becomes a liquid, for
example)." 5 One of the characteristics of models is that they cease to operate,
even as analogies, beyond their limits of application. Perhaps a better way to put
the matter is that models must be used within their constraints.
2. On the Usefulness of Bad Models: From Light Waves and Particles
to Planetary Motion
This discussion brings up a related question: how bad can a model be, and
still be useful? This is an issue that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Daubert
and its progeny fails to address, and yet, as we shall see, it is a critical problem.
Imagine that a concept gives valid results only part of the time. Is it useful, then?
To take a specific example, we have two radically different concepts of light: the
wave theory and the particle theory.' Wave theory is useful for some purposes,
such as explaining color and interference.' 8 7 But particle theory, which
conceives of light as a stream of particles called "photons," is better for
understanding other phenomena, such as the photoelectric effect.' 88
How can light be like a wave, like those that we see in the ocean, and a
stream of particles like tiny baseballs, both at the same time? The answer is that
it is not really "like" those things, and waves and particles are mere analogies.
These physical comparisons are merely the best that human minds can do to
understand this unique phenomenon called light. We probably will never see
either a photon or a light wave, since the required resolution by definition makes
it impractical to see them using light itself. But how do we know which model
to use? Is the choice by which we decide which model to use really "scientific"?
An answer to this question based upon the Daubertreasoning would respond

183. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 307-08.
184. See supra Part II.A. 1.
185. See REESE, supra note 73, at 602-04.
186. "[E]lectrons too [or light] could not be regarded simply as corpuscles, ....
periodicity [i.e., frequency, as with waves] must be assigned to them also." LOUIS DE
BROGLIE, MATTER AND LIGHT: THE NEW PHYSICS 169 (W.H. Johnston trans., 1939)
(1937); REESE, supra note 73, at 1235-39.
187. REESE, supra note 73, at 1053-54, 1104-05.
188. REESE, supra note 73, at 6, 1211-16.
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that it is not scientific, because it is driven by what works rather than by what is
falsifiable. We cannot prove or disprove that light is "like" waves or particles,
because it is like (and unlike) both. The Daubert approach, literally applied,
would exclude such a theory, even though it can be useful.
Another example, from the opposite end of the scale, is raised by the
mechanics of planetary motion, or rather by the history of our understanding of
it. In the second century A.D., the Alexandrian astronomer Ptolemy publicized
a concept of the universe with a fixed earth at its center and the sun, moon,
planets, and stars rotating about it.' 89 Was this model "scientific"? The answer,
entirely plausibly, is yes, at least in terms of the Daubertdecision, in that a great
deal of observation could be offered to support it, and no one knew how to
falsify it at the time.
In later years, the earth-centered model was refined. The heavenly bodies
all were embedded in concentric balls of crystal, to reflect their different
distances from the earth. Their rotation (believe it or not) was thought to
produce "the music of the spheres. '"90

For a long time after that, politically correct scientists postulated "epicyclic"
orbits for the planets.' 9 ' These were necessary because observation showed that
planets sometimes backtracked in the sky.' 92 An epicycle is the shape traced by
a point on a circle that rolls about the circumference of another circle, and it
explained the so-called "retrogression" of the planets.'93 But again, the theory
failed to account for observations, leading scientists to construct epicycles within
epicycles. One factor driving this conceptualization was the Church, which
preferred the existing earth-centered model over the sun-centered Copernican
model to such an extent that it punished heretics, including Galileo, for efforts
to challenge it. Epicycles fit the data better and, under the reasoning of Daubert,
might appear more "scientific" than the Ptolemaic model.'94
Finally, Copernicus's model won out, featuring a solar system that had the
sun at its center.'95 But some scientists still erred in seeing planetary orbits as
circular, whereas today we know them to be elliptical. 96 Was the basic
Copernican model, then, unscientific? And, of course, Copernicus failed to
adjust orbits for such phenomena as gravitational influences of close-passing

189. REESE, supra note 73, at 4, 1042.
190. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 309-10.
191. See COLIN RONAN, THE ASTRONOMERS chs. 4, 5 (1964); CRUMP, supranote
72, at 309-10.
192. See authorities cited supra note 73.
193. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 443.
194. See authorities cited supra note 73.
195. See REESE, supra note 73, at 3-4.
196. See REESE, supra note 73, at 3-4.
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bodies or solar wind. Perhaps the lack of an accounting for such future
knowledge makes even our current views unscientific in Daubert terms!
And we can take this history one step farther by hypothesizing a revision of
the earth-centered Ptolemaic universe. With more complex mathematics, we
could ensure that an earth-centered model accurately conformed to planetary
motions.197 After all, the Ptolemaists were justified in the sense that all motion
is relative.' 98 It makes as much sense from the standpoint of mechanics to regard
the sun as moving with respect to the earth as to regard the earth moving with
respect to the sun. It also makes for more complicated calculations to describe
the "motion" of the sun "around" the earth, but theoretically, it could be done.'99
And if that could be done, theoretically, we could describe the motions of the
planets "around" the earth, with still more complex mathematics.
If our principal or exclusive criterion is falsifiability, as Daubertsuggests,"'
this odd, complicated view of the solar system-the "Advanced Ptolemaic"
theory-would be a good scientific model. This result follows from the
relatively confined approach that the Supreme Court adopted toward science. A
related problem is that the Daubertapproach might exclude good models, as we
shall see in the next section of this Article.
B. A Six-PartMethodfor Detecting a Good Scientific Model
1. Tractability, Simplicity, and Validity: Factors for Evaluating
Models
One well-known conception describes three characteristics of a good
scientific model: tractability, simplicity, and empirical validity.2"' The first
factor, "tractability," means the amenability of the model to coherent treatment,
or its workability. A jumble of uncorrelated experimental results might be
empirically accurate, but it would not provide a good model because it would not
be tractable. The second factor, "simplicity," is the concept described as
Occam's Razor, supra. Finally, "validity" means correspondence to empirical
observation, the principal criterion featured in the Dauberttest.
This multi-factor theory avoids the trap of exclusive reliance on the views
of either the rationalists or the empiricists. It recognizes that a model may be bad
because it badly fits the empirical data. But it also recognizes that a model may
be bad even though it mirrors reality perfectly, if it is not tractable-particularly

197. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 309-10.

198. Cf REESE, supra note 73, at 129-33 (explaining relative velocity addition).
199. See REESE, supra note 73.
200. See supra Part I.A.

201. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 311-12 (explaining these criteria and refining
them).
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if there is a more workable model that entails only an insignificant loss in
validity. 20 2 This theory, unlike the Daubertapproach, enables us to discard the
"Advanced Ptolemaic" model described above-the clumsy approach of
assuming an earth-centered universe, and then sending the sun and planets in
orbit around it by the use of complex mathematics.
In fact, there have been many approaches to this question. The great
philosopher of science Charles Sanders Peirce, like the Supreme Court, reduced
science to a matter of empiricism. Peirce's view is summarily described by
Nicholas Rescher as follows:
For Peirce, the only true test of the correctness of a theory is whether
the interferences, applications, and predictions based on it prove
successful. Purely intellectual factors such as explanatory power,
parsimony, intuitive appeal, antecedent probability resulting from
concordance with previously accepted theories, etc., are, for him,
considerations relevant to the abductive process of selecting theories
and hypotheses for testing. But these purely intellectual factors have
of verifying the truth
no place in the specifically retroductive process
20 a
of theories and assessing their acceptability.
On the other hand, physicist Steven Hawking posits what he calls a two-part
theory (although it actually contains more than two ingredients): "A theory is a
good theory if it satisfies two requirements: it must accurately describe a large
class of observations on the basis of a model that contains only a few arbitrary
elements, and it must make definite predictions about the results of future
observations."2 4 Actually, Hawking's two-part test fits comfortably with the
three-part test described earlier. Hawking says that a theory must make "definite
predictions about the results of future observations," or in other words, it must
be (1) tractable. It must contain "only a few arbitrary elements," and, thus, it
must be (2) simple. And finally, it must "accurately describe a large class of
observations," meaning that it must be (3) empirically valid.

202. See infra Part III.B.2.
203. NICHOLAS RESCHER, PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: CRITICAL STUDIES
IN HIS THEORY OF INDUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 11 (1978).

204. Dan Hunter, No Wilderness of Single Instances: Inductive Inference in the
Law, 48 J.LEGAL. EDUC. 365,372 (1998) (quoting STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY
OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 9

(1988)).
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2. Toward a General Theory of Scientific Models: A Six-Factor
Approach to Compare to the DaubertFactors
Elsewhere, in another work, I have described a more detailed theory of
scientific modeling, featuring a six-factor approach.2 °" The six factors are
refinements of the original three factors of tractability, simplicity, and empirical
validity. First, I believe that tractability consists of at least two factors: (1)
communicationaltractability, or how well the model can be used to convey ideas
from one person to another, and (2) computationaltractability, or the amenability
of the model to mathematical calculations.20 6 Then, simplicity also involves at
least two factors: (3) Occam's Razor, or the preference for the fewest number
of arbitrary elements, and (4) generality, or the propensity of the model to
organize larger rather than smaller amounts of data (this ingredient also appears
in Hawking's statement).20 7 Finally, validity consists of at least two elements:
(5) close correspondence to empirical observation within the range of the
model's correct application, and (6) clear demarcation of its limits or
constraints. "°8
In summary, a scientific model is good if: (1) it is readily communicable,
(2) suitable for calculations, (3) based on relatively few elements, (4) generally
applicable, (5) consistent with observed data, and (6) subject to a clearly defined
range of application. It is a poor model if it is: (1) difficult to communicate, (2)
hard to use for a calculation, (3) bristling with arbitrary elements, (4) narrowly
applicable, (5) crude in accuracy, and (6) unclear in the limits of its applicability.
Let us, now, illustrate each of these six factors with examples. We shall also
compare the factors with the Daubertapproach.
a. Communicability: A Factor Omitted from the DaubertApproach
The first factor is communicability, or usefulness in conveying the idea to
an uninitiated person. Because this concept bears a close resemblance to the
"assist" standard in Rule 702, one might suppose that the Daubert approach
would emphasize it, but as we shall see, Daubertseems to omit this factor.
As an example of the communicability criterion, let us consider models of
the particles in an atom. Models range from the crude but familiar to the
sophisticated but fearsomely mathematical.0 9 Quantum physics, such as the
forest of squiggles known as the Schroedinger Wave Equation, provides a more
accurate description of the behavior of electrons than does the simplistic ball-

205. CRUMP, supra note 72, at 311-14.
206. CRUMP, supra note 72, at 311-14.
207. CRUMP, supra note 72, at 311-14.
208. CRUMP, supra note 72, at 311-14.
209. See supra note 210.
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and-stick or "meatball" model of an atom. 21 ' Nevertheless, the meatball model

may be superior for some applications. If we are trying to communicate with
average jurors about the relative functions of electrons, protons, and neutrons in
a prototypical element, and if the context of the problem does not require
attention to quantum effects, the meatball model will be decidedly better for
communicating what is meaningful. In this usage, it is a better scientific
model.2 1
One problem with the Daubertformulation is that it does not recognize this
factor at all. It does not recognize the tradeoff between communicational
tractability and empirical validity. The meatball model is inaccurate, and that is
the touchstone of the Daubert approach. The possibility that a negligible
sacrifice in empirical validity (with respect to an irrelevant matter) might lead to
significantly more meaningful and valuable communication is not expressly a
part of the Daubert calculus.
b. Calculability: Also Omitted under Daubert
Next, we consider the second factor, calculational tractability (or
"calculability"). Let us use the everyday example of finding the circumference
of a circle, using the formula C = 27rr. Pi (7r) is an irrational number, and,
therefore, all we can do in the real number system is to approximate or model it.
For some uses, we might need a precisely defined model of n, with many decimal
places, such as 3.14159 ... ,although even if we were to calculate it out to a
hundred decimal places, any real number we might produce still would be
provably wrong.2 12 For many uses, it is customary to model 7t by using the
simple fraction, twenty-two sevenths (22/7), which is close to 3.14159 but less
exact, because it is simpler to use in calculations.2" 3 In short, 22/7 might

210. The Schroedinger Wave Equation computes energy levels in Electron Shells.
Are you ready?

=

i

=

dt

2

2

2m

This model uses what my old Physical Chemistry text calls "familiar mathematics"(!)
although it also says that this "simplified equation" is "such a bad approximation that it
is no value." For an approach accessible to students of college physics, see REESE, supra
note 73, 1260, 1263-64.
211. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 312-14.

212. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 997 (1995).
213. Specifically, 22/7 = 3.1429, which differs from 7t by a figure that cannot be
specified but slightly exceeds 0,0005.
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sometimes be a better model for t than the more
accurate 3.14159. It is more
14
computationally tractable (or more calculable).
Let us imagine a Daubert hearing in which a scientist has used the 22/7
model, and the opposing lawyer desires to exclude the expert's opinion. Perhaps
the problem is one for which 22/7 is a serviceable estimate of t (for example, let
us assume that t is used in this case to estimate the number of plants necessary
to border a circular flower bed). The examination of the witness proceeds
somewhat as follows:
Q.: Now, Doctor, when you used 22/7 as a substitute for pi,
you knew it wasn't accurate, didn't you?
A.: Well .... yes. It's not "accurate."

Q.: Well, can you tell us what would be an accurate number
for pi?
A.: No. You see, there isn't an exactly accurate number for
pi in our decimal system. It's an irrational number.
The judge (turning pale): What? Irrational?
A.: Yes. Irrational.
(The judge shakes his head.)
Q.: Okay, Doctor. Now, let's talk a little bit about the peer
review issue, because Justice Blackmun suggested in
Daubert that we ought to talk peer review. The fact that
22/7 is not an accurate value for pi has been peer reviewed,
hasn't it? What I mean by that, is: every mathematician
would recognize that pi is an irrational number and that
22/7ths doesn't really fit it, isn't that right?
A.: Yes.
(The judge shakes his head.)
Q.: And what about the rate of error, Doctor? I'll bet
you're going to tell me that yes, there's an error in 22/7, but
you can't tell us how big it is.
A.: [brightening]: Exactly! Because pi is an irrational
number, there's no way to tell exactly how inaccurate any
particular estimator might be.
A prudent opposing attorney in this situation would refrain from asking about
general acceptance, because any mathematician would recognize 22/7 as a
serviceable approximation for t in appropriate uses. The trouble is, Daubert
requires a complex, treacherous inquiry to figure this out. There can be no
assurance, indeed, that a conscientious Daubert inquiry conducted by a judge

214. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 312-14.
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who did not understand 7c to begin with would ever figure it out, because
computational tractability is not a part of the Daubertcalculus.
Perhaps this appears to be an excessively pessimistic treatment of the
Daubert factors. That appearance, however, results from the simplicity of the
example, which is kept simple for reasons of clarity. Only a judge who has slept
through an entire secondary education and who never learned about n could
accept the argument for exclusion in this case. The problem, however, is that the
scientific principles at issue may be more complex than this example, and less
familiar to the judge. The point, again, is that no model is ever perfectly
empirically valid,215 and a negligible sacrifice in empirical validity may help us
to choose a better model if we focus upon computational tractability.216 But this
issue is not a feature of the Daubertfactors, and given that the existing factors
emphasize issues unrelated to computational tractability, it may be impossible as
a practical matter to get it across to a non-scientist judge.
c. Simplicity: The Third Factor, Also Absent from Daubert
The third factor is simplicity. Consider again the comparison between the
Ptolemaic solar system and the Copernican one.217 As we have seen, it might be
possible to develop a series of equations that accurately would describe the solar
system using the Ptolemaic model, i.e., with the sun circling the earth.2" 8 From
the point of view of pure empirical validity, this model might be made to work
as accurately as the Copernican model, provided that the equations we use are
sophisticated enough to describe actual celestial motions. This "Advanced
Ptolemaic" model would be inferior to the Copernican theory, or at least most
approaches to science would so label it, and the main reason is simplicity.2" 9 The
"Advanced Ptolemaic" system requires more arbitrary elements than the
straightforward Copernican model.
The Daubert formulation, however, does not recognize this simplicity
factor. This is an arguable shortcoming of the scientific philosophy that the
Supreme Court has adopted.
d. Generality: The Fourth Factor, Also Omitted from the DaubertCriteria
The fourth factor is generality: the suitability of the model to describe a
range of data, not just an idiosyncratic event. Let us resort once again to

215. See supra Part II.A.1.
216. See CRUMP, supra note 72, at 312-14.
217, See supra Part III.A.2.
218. See supra Part III.A.2.
219. See supra Part III.A.2.
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considering the "Advanced Ptolemaic" model.22 ° Even assuming we could
develop an accurate description of how known, existing solar system bodies
move by sophisticated equations built on the Ptolemaic theory, this model might
function poorly in describing other phenomena, such as the motion of a newly
discovered comet. Moreover, it would require new empiricism before we could
predict how a comet might behave in the vicinity of Alpha Centauri. Such a
model would fail Hawking's requirement that it "describe a large class of
observations,"22 ' and in my six-part system, it would be inferior because it lacks
generality.
The Daubertfactors do not include this generality issue. Again, this is an
arguable shortcoming in the Supreme Court's scientific philosophy.
e. Validity: The Linchpin of the DaubertPhilosophy
Then, there is the issue of empirical validity. Consider Newton's physics,
as compared to relativity theory. For some usages, Newtonian mechanics, in
which F = ma (force equals mass times acceleration),2. 2 and in which energy is
conserved within closed systems,223 may be highly accurate. But Newtonian
mechanics are a poor model when relativistic effects are significant, such as in
the space that is very close to a black hole.224 The Daubert validity factors do
not consider this issue, although a separate construct within the Daubert
approach does deal with it. Daubertrequires not only a principle that is valid,
but one that "fits" the problem.225 We might conclude that, when the issue
concerns mechanics in the vicinity of a black hole, the Newtonian model does
not fit.
Thus, the Daubert approach points to the answer in this case. This,
however, is the only one of the proposed six tests of a good theory that is
covered by Daubert.
f. Demarcation: The Final Factor, Omitted from the Daubert Approach
Then, finally, there is the issue of demarcation. Every theory has limits, and
the theory may be better or worse because of our ability to tell where the limits
are. A theory with defined, recognizable limits is better demarcated than one that
requires us to guess whether it is applicable. Let us use the example of
biological taxonomy, which may be a valuable science, but which produces

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
REESE, supra note 73, at 176.
REESE, supra note 73, at ch. 13.
REESE, supra note 73, at 349-50.
See supra Part I.A.
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difficulties with respect to demarcation.226 The taxonomy of classifying a whale
as a mammal along with a horse is valid in some respects, in that it allows us 22to7
infer that the two are alike: they are warm-blooded, hairy, and viviparous.
Beyond the definitional characteristics, however, the mammal model does not
tell us very precisely which other characteristics may or may not be similar: the
whale's size and ability to remain underwater, the horse's hoofs, mane, and
running ability. We cannot really know whether any given prediction we make
about the whale, based upon the horse, is going to prove true.228
This imprecision in demarcation might be a defect in the "mammal" model
for some purposes, and the Daubert factors do not direct us to it. Again, this
omission is a criticism of the scientific philosophy adopted in Daubert.
C. Consequences of the Daubert Treatment of Scientific Models
To the extent that this six-factor test of scientific models is meaningful, the
Daubertfactors create a dubious philosophy. The only factor for which Daubert
points a signpost in the correct direction is that of validity. But communicability,
calculability, simplicity, generality, and demarcation also are factors by which
many scientific theories appropriately can be judged. Indeed, these other factors
seem particularly important in the context of a trial before a jury. In this context,
communicability is a major component of the assistance the theory can provide
to the jury. Generality helps to avoid the application of a theory beyond its
limits, and demarcation helps a jury to understand when the theory applies.
Some of these factors can be accessed through the Daubert factors, but the
derivation is indirect. For example, tractability and simplicity may lead to
general acceptance of a theory that is slightly less empirically valid, at least for
some uses. 229 Thus, the general acceptance factor may be a way to read factors
into the Daubertcriteria that do not depend purely on empirical validity. 3 ' In
some kinds of cases, perhaps peer review and error rates might do the same.3
The problem, however, is that the Daubert listing of the four validity-related
factors does not focus the inquiry accurately. More importantly, the Supreme
Court's exclusive concentration on the question of empirical observation as the

226. See supra Part II.B.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.B. 1.
See supra Part I.A.
231. See supra Part I.A. Peer review may discuss tractability and simplicity, and

if the increase in rate of error is known to be small from a shift to a more tractable or
simple model, that factor may be helpful too.
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IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT?
The shortcomings of the Daubertapproach could have been avoided if the
Court had refrained from issuing detailed dicta, in the form of its four recognized
validity factors, when it had acquired no experience in the subject. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's partial dissent, in which he advised against these premature
statements, pointed toward a wiser course, and the Court should have heeded
it.233 The Court may have believed that it was articulating a flexible... doctrine,
in light of its provision for the addition of other criteria. But as often happens,
a premature pronouncement that was intended to be flexible has become an
established set of criteria.235 It was foolhardy for the Court to ignore what was
going to happen, which was that trial judges would consider the four Daubert
factors to be legal principles established by the Supreme Court."'
Again, Professor Imwinkelried has wise counsel to the opposite effect:
I seriously doubt that we would better off if Blackmun had ruled only
that Rule 402 superseded Frye. At least the Court had the benefit of
tens of amicus briefs, including many by scientific organizations. If
Blackmun had not made any attempt to fill the void left by overruling
Frye, I suspect that we'd have even more confusion among the lower
courts. Based on my conversations with judges, I have the impression
that the typical jurist in the trenches appreciated the guidance in
Daubertand laments the lack of guidance in Kumho.237
Guidance to the lower courts obviously is an important attribute in a Supreme
Court opinion. The guidance is less useful, however, if it is ill fitting or wrong,
and that result becomes more likely when the Court does not know the territory.
It is a balancing act. If it issues opaque opinions, the Court cannot expect
uniform obedience, but on the other hand, if it offers general observations

232. See supra Part I.A.
233. See supra Part I.A.
234. The Court said that flexibility was its goal. See supra Part I.A.
235. In fact, the Court reproduced and emphasized the four factors in Kumho. See
supra note 97 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (describing the Plaza case, in
which a district court applied the "Daubert factors" to reach the outlandish result of
uniformly excluding fingerprint identification).
237. E-mail from Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried to Professor David Crump
(Mar. 12, 2002, 9:39 a.m.) (copy on file with author).
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prematurely, it can expect the law to fall into a morass unless it has accurately
guessed the shape of things to come. Worse yet, it may set the law in concrete
and confuse issues yet to be confronted, as happened when Daubert led to
Kumho. I believe the Court's call for appropriate validation238 was useful and
well-targeted, and that should have been all that the Court said, even though it
may not have settled everything in one opinion. Likewise, I believe the four
criteria in the Court's general observations went too far for a Court that found
itself in uncharted territory.
In Kumho, the Court left the law in an even more unnecessary state of
dysfunction. The Court recognized that non-scientific expert evidence was
different from scientific evidence in ways that would vary from case to case, but
then directed the lower courts to apply the scientific criteria to the extent they
might prove useful.239 The result is analogous to telling a person unfamiliar with

both that a television set differs from an orange, but that unpredictable
characteristics of one can appropriately be used in treating the other. The
hypothetical listener should be forgiven if she attempts to eat the television set
and watch the orange. That is what has happened in the cases that have followed
Kumho. The result is decisions labeling fingerprint identification inadmissible
and, for that matter, the result reached in Kumho itself.
The Daubert-Kumho line of cases is, however, the law of the land. This
reality limits the practical issues. The question is, what can be done to make the
most of it? The brightest prospect would be for the Supreme Court to overrule
Daubert-Kumho and return to the "helpfulness" or "assist" standard that is
embodied in Rule 702. Judges then could see expert opinion as primarily a
relevance-based problem. Highly inaccurate expert evidence deserves to be
excluded not because of something that Karl Popper said, but because it lacks
sufficient probative value, compared to its tendencies to prejudice, confuse, and
mislead, so that it fails the balancing test of Rule 403, as well as the assistance
standard of Rule 702. One advantage of this approach is that it would allow
admissibility decisions to be made under the standard of Rule 104(b). The
question before the judge would be, "could a reasonable juror find this evidence
to be helpful?," and it would not place the judge in the position of determining
the, validity of the scientific theory as a kind of amateur scientist. This
difference, in turn, would mean that the Dauberthearings that so clog the trial
courts today, and that so confuse the admissibility question, would become
shorter and more focused. Junk science still could be excluded as not providing
assistance, and as the Court pointed out in Daubert,the mechanisms of summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law provide additional ways to reach the
same result.

238. See supra Part I.A.
239. See supra Part I.C.
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Unfortunately, abandonment of Daubert-Kumho also is unlikely.
Nevertheless a trial judge can improve the administration of expert opinion
decisions by recalling that the Daubertdecision was premised upon the liberal
admissibility policy embodied in the federal rules. The overarching question
remains whether the opinion will "assist" jurors to understand the evidence or to
determine facts in issue. The Court captured this idea, as Professor Imwinkelried
suggests, when it required "appropriate validation.""24 It is this concept, not the
four subsidiary Daubert"factors," that controls. The factors are means to an end
(the end being a showing of appropriate validation, or of sufficient reliability to
assist the jury), not specific requirements to be strictly applied. This
consideration, together with the flexibility"' that the Daubert opinion
emphasizes, should enable the judge to consider communicability, calculability,
generality, and demarcation 242-the criteria for evaluating a scientific theory that
do not deal exclusively with empirical validity-so that the result will be the
assistance to the jury that Rule 702 requires of expert testimony.

240. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part III.B.2.
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